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SKYJACKING CRIME CONTROL MODELS
W. WILLIAM MINOR*
A model of crime control is an abstraction
which may be inferred from specific crime con-
trol policies. Consideration of the models im-
plicit in specific policies permits the social sci-
entist to evaluate the broader implications of
various crime control strategies. It further per-
mits policy-makers to detect and eliminate con-
tradictory aspects of their policies, thereby
maximizing effectiveness in terms of stated
objectives.
Historically, the two dominant approaches to
crime control have been the deterrence model
and the positivistic rehabilitation model. More
recently, a prevention' model has emerged as
an alternative control system for some forms
of crime.
There are three major issues which a crime
control model must address: effectiveness,
fiscal cost and social costs. By these criteria,
neither the deterrence model nor the rehabilita-
tion model has been very successful.
Deterrence appears to be effective only for
instrumental offenses committed by those with
a high stake in conformity. Two examples are
parking violations and "snitch" shoplifting.2
Fiscally, a deterrence model would require a
massive machinery to ensure swiftness, sever-
ity and certainty of punishment for all
offenders. 3 Due to the enormous social costs
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I As used herein, "prevention" refers to the
elimination of the opportunity for crime through
modification of the environment in which crime oc-
curs. See generally C. R. JEFFERY, CRIME PREVEN-
TION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (1971).
2 M. CAMERON, THE BOOSTER AND THE SNITCH
(1964); W. CHAMBLISS, CRIME & THE LEGAL
PROCESS 365-72 (1969); E. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973); Chambliss, The
Deterrent Influence of Punishment, 12 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 70 (1966). See also Tittle & Logan,
Sanctions and Deviance: Evidence and Remaining
Queszons, 7 LAW & SOcIETY Rxv. 371 (1973).
3 Jeffery estimates that a ninety-fold increase of
the entire criminal justice system would be neces-
involved,4 such a machinery would probably be
impracticable in a democratic society.
As correctional statistics routinely indicate,
the rehabilitation model has also been ineffec-
tive for crime control. Further, the rehabilita-
tion model is a reactive system, incapable of
being employed until after the crime occurs.5
Although the fiscal cost of a rehabilitation
model is enormous,6 attention is now being
increasingly focused on the social costs of re-
habilitative systems. Involuntary commitment,
denial of due process, stigmatization, indeter-
minate commitment and lack of effective treat-
ment are problems which have tarnished the
rehabilitative ideal.
The prevention model discussed in this paper
is one of "mechanical" or "primary" preven-
tion. As Lejins notes, in this form of preven-
tion model, obstacles are placed in the way of
the potential offender so that it becomes diffi-
cult or impossible for him to commit an of-
fense. This preventive action does not involve
the personality of the individual since there is
no attempt to influence his intentions by
sary. Jeffery, Environmental Design and the Pre-
vention of Behavioral Disorders and Criminality,
(paper presented at the Centre of Criminology,
University of Toronto, January 25, 1973).
4 A fully-applied deterrence model would require
nullification of customary procedural safeguards,
such as the freedom from unwarranted search and
seizure, or the right to trial. For a description of
the use of such a deterrence model during emer-
gency conditions, see H. SALISBURY, THE 900 DAYS
516-19 (1969). Even a limited deterrence model,
however, raises certain ethical issues, such as the
application of exemplary penalties. Andenaes, The
General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 949 (1966).
s C. R. JEFFERY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 18-20 (1971).
6 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUJS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT
-AN ASSESSMENT 53-56 (1967).
7See generally F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND O'
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); N. KrrTRIE, THE
RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971); T. SzASz, PSY-
CHIATRIC JUSTICE (1965); Rosenhan, On Beig
Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973).
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threatening punishment or by changing his
"motivation. As a result, the term mechanical
-prevention is suggested 8
There is little support for such a prevention
'model. Decker found that installation of park-
ing meters which rejected slugs and displayed
the last coin deposited in a coin view window
reduced the rate of slug usage more effectively
than labels warning of severe legal penalties. 9
NIewman found that certain types of architec-
tural design were related to crime rates in
public housing developments.10 Jeffery argues
that:
Current emphasis is placed on indirect con-
trols on the individual criminal after the
offense has occurred. The model to be devel-
oped and supported in this book is one of di-
rect controls over environmental conditions be-
fore the offense has occurred. It is
economically less expensive to design an envi-
ronment in which crimes are not possible than
to rehabilitate all who have the opportunity to
commit crimes.1
Jeffery's faith, however, rests more on the
-demonstrated failures of the deterrence and re-
habilitation models than on the demonstrated
success of a prevention model.
Because the prevention model has rarely
been applied, systematic analysis of its effec-
tiveness, fiscal cost and social costs has not
previously been available.1 2 Consequently, it is
8 Lejins, The Field of Prevention, in DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION 5 (W. Amos & C. Wellford
eds. 1967). Brantingham describes primary preven-
tion as the elimination of the opportunity for
crime through modification of the environment in
which crime occurs, as opposed to the identifica-
tion and treatment of predelinquents (secondary
prevention) or the prevention of recidivism by
convicted offenders (tertiary prevention). Bran-
tingham, Spatial Analysis of Crime and Primary
Prevention (paper presented at Regional Confer-
•ence for Criminal Justice Planning Personnel,
Tallahassee, Florida, September 18, 1973).
0 Decker, Curbside Deterrence?, 10 CRImiNOL-
.oGY 127 (1972).
10 0. NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE (1972). See
.also Jeffery, Environmental Design and the Pre-
vention of Behaviorial Disorders and Criminality
(paper presented at the Centre of Criminology,
University of Toronto, January 25, 1973).
11 C. R. JEF7ERY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 20 (1971) (italics in
original).
12 Newman, for example, does not explicitly dis-
cuss the fiscal and social costs of defensible space
design. NEWMAN, supra note 10.
necessary to consider the history of a particu-
lar crime and efforts to control it in the
United States. It is the contention of this arti-
cle that the history of skyjacking control ef-
forts represents a movement from a deterrence
model to a prevention model. This movement
permits a case-history analysis of the effective-
ness, fiscal cost and social costs of preventive
crime control.
SKYJACKING IN THE UNITED STATES
As indicated in Table 1, about 40 per cent
of all skyjackings and skyjacking attempts have
involved United States aircraft (37 per cent of
successes and of attempts for 1930-1974,'44 per
cent of successes and 43 per cent of attempts for
1968-1974). In the United States, 102 (61 per
cent) of the 168 attempts have been success-
ful. 3 The history of skyjackings in the United
States may be divided into three phases, accord-
ing to the dominant motives of the skyjackers:
escape, political terrorism and extortion.1 4
The apparent motive of most American
skyjackings has been escape to Cuba. 86 of
the 102 successful skyjackings have terminated
there. Prior to 1961, the United States' only
experience with skyjacking was the receiving,
welcoming and granting of political asylum to
refugees fleeing Castro's Cuba.' 5 Thus, when
the first American airliner was diverted to Cuba
in May, 1961, the United States was caught in
a politically embarassing situation. That plane
was held by the Cuban government for almost
a month before it was exchanged for a Cuban
naval vessel moored in Key West. American
skyjackers considered Cuba a haven for the next
decade, even though their reception there was
uncertain: Some were welcomed as friends of
the Cuban people; some were returned to the
United States; and some were imprisoned in
13 Unless otherwise cited, all data on hijacking
are derived from Fmxw.L AVIATION ADMINumsRA-
TIoN, CIVIL AVIATION SEcURITY SERVICE, WORID-
WIDE REPORTED HIJACKING ATTEMPTs-SuMmARI-
ZATION, (Jan. 1, 1975) [hereinafter cited as HIJACK-
ING ATTEMPTS].
14 Cf. Sundberg, Political Hijacking, in PoLITIcs,
CRIME AND THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE 108 (F.
Adler & G. Mueller eds. 1972);. R. TURI, C.
F Z , R. SHELDON & J. MATTHEws, DESCRIPTIVE
STUDY oF AIRCRAFT HIJACKING 143 (1972).




Successful and Total Skyjacking Attempts, United States and Worldwide, 1930-1974
Successful Attempts Total Attempts
Year
U.S. World U.S.% U.S. World U.S.%
1930-1967 7 59 12 12 79 15
1968 18 29 62 22 35 63
1969 33 70 47 40 87 46
1970 18 55 33 27 83 33
1971 12 22 55 27 58 47
1972 10 23 43 31 62 50
1973 1 11 9 2 22 9
1974 3 8 38 7 26 27
Total 102 277 37 168 452 37
SOURCE: FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, "WORLDWIDE REPORTED
HIJACKING ATTEm'ss-SuMMARIZATION," (January 1, 1975).
1 Including United States.
Cuba. 6 Six of the seven successful skyjackings
(of twelve attempts) in the United States be-
tween 1961 and 1967 terminated in Cuba.
Skyjackings increased dramatically in 1968,
when 18 of 22 attempts were successful in
reaching Cuba.
In 1969, skyjackings to Cuba continued, but
in that year the United States was introduced
to skyjacking as a form of political
terrorism. 17 On August 29, 1969, two members
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an American air-
liner, flew it to Damascus, and, after releasing
the passengers and crew, destroyed the air-
craft. The PFLP conducted several other ter-
rorist skyjackings against Israel, the United
States and other pro-Israeli states in 1969 and
1970. The culminating action was Operation
Abu Thalaat, which resulted in the destruction
of four jetliners in September, 1970. It enabled
16 U.S. NEws & W. REP., Dec. 4, 1972, at 44;
J. AREY, THE Sxy PIRATs 49-74 (1972).
17 The distinction between terror and terrorism
must be noted. Although any skyjacking may
evoke terror (a state of extreme fearfulness), the
concept of terrorism implies the systematic use of
violence by an organized party or group in order
to achieve its goals. Hardman, Terrorisrn, 14 EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 575 (E. Se-
ligman ed. 1937). See also Hutchinson, The Con-
cept of Revolutionary Terrorism, 16 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 383 (1972). For a fuller discussion of
terrorist skyjackings see Sundberg, supra note 14.
the PFLP to exchange hostages for prisoners
captured during earlier operations, but the ac-
tion also incensed world opinion and led to the
subsequent crushing of the PFLP by the Royal
Jordanian Army.'5
The extortion phase of skyjacking began on
November 24, 1971, when D.B. Cooper ex-
torted $200,000 from Northwestern Airlines
and parachuted into the forest near Woodland,
Washington. 9 Since Cooper's successful and
famous extortion skyjacking, there have been
twenty-one other extortion attempts in the
United States, including several attempts to
duplicate Cooper's act. None, however, have
been ultimately successful.
2 0
1s Sundberg, supra note 14, at 116.
19 Sagarin identifies Cooper as an "anti-hero."
Sagarin, New Offenses: New Offenders-Intro-
duction, in POLITICS, CRmME AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SCENE 9 (F. Adler & G. Mueller eds.
1972).
20 In three of the twenty-one attempts, the sky-
jackers reached their destination, but were either
placed in custody there or had the extorted funds
confiscated and returned. Only Cooper is presumed
free with the money he extorted. Air Transport
Association, Hijacking/Extortion Attempts: A
Study of Futility (mimeographed, 1973)(Herein-
after cited as Hijacking/Extortion Attempts];
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, CrVnL AVIA-
TION SECURITY SERVICE, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
AIRBRAFT HIJACKING, (Jan. 1, 1975).
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SKYJACKING CONTROL EFFORTS 21
Efforts to control skyjacking may be best un-
derstood as representative of underlying crime
-control models. Viewed in this sense, the history
,of skyjacking control efforts demonstrates a
progression from a deterrence model to a pre-
vention model of crime control. (Because of the
-crime's unique combination of characteristics,
a rehabilitation model has never been seriously
proposed as a solution to the problem of sky-
jacking. The underlying reasons have been that
skyjacking requires little technical skill; occurs
with low frequency; is highly visible; may be
very costly; arouses great fear; and is non-
repetitive.
22)
Demands for government action to control
skyjacking occurred immediately after the first
American hijacking in 1961. Public reaction
included demands for military action against
Cuba, United Nations' intervention and a man-
datory death penalty for skyjackers. On Sep-
tember 5, 1961, a federal anti-hijacking bill was
enacted, providing for a minimum twenty year
sentence and a maximum punishment of death
for convicted skyjackers.22 The Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) authorized air-
lines to arm flight crews, but the airlines de-
clined on the basis that inflight gun battles
would be more dangerous than complying with
the demands of hijackers. The Air Lines Pi-
lots Association (ALPA) urged pre-flight pas-
senger searches, and three airlines requested
permission from the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) to deny passage to anyone refusing to
be searched for weapons. The search proposal
was not employed by the airlines, however, for
fear of offending passengers.
In 1963, the United States and sixty other
nations participated in the International Con-
ference on Air Law in Tokyo, Japan. The con-
ference was held under the auspices of the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization
.(ICAO), an agency of the United Nations. At
the conclusion of the conference, the United
States and fifteen other nations initialed the
21 Specific citations to the material used in this
section may be obtained from the author.
22 The only known repeat hijacker is Leila
Khaled, a PFLP leader, who hijacked aircraft on
August 28, 1969 and September 6, 1970. DoMESTIC
AND FOREIGN AIRc AFr HIJACUNGS, supra note 20.
23 49 U.S.C. § 1472.
"Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft." This con-
vention recognized "unlawful seizure of air-
craft" as an offense, provided for restoration
of property and permitted-but did not man-
date-extradition or punishment of hijackers
by contracting states. The United States did
not formally ratify the convention until 1969,
following the dramatic upsurge in the number
of American skyjackings in 1968 and 1969.
In 1964, the FAA ordered cockpit doors
locked during flight as a preventive measure
against skyjackings. Because a hijacker could
still threaten stewardesses and passengers, this
was not a very effective measure and it was
partially rescinded sixteen months after taking
effect. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
this was the first measure enacted on the basis
of prevention rather than deterrence.
In July, 1968, the United States State De-
partment offered free rides from Miami to
Cuba for Cuban exiles wishing to return. The
hope was that this action would remove the
motivation for skyjackings by Cubans wishing
to return to their homes.
In addition, more direct preventive efforts
received serious consideration. The Air Trans-
port Association (ATA) initiated a study of a
magnetometer developed by Lockheed, while
House Republicans prepared legislation to re-
quire bullet-proofing of all pilot cabins. 24 By
early 1969, the FAA was considering measures
for the detection of potential hijackers before
an actual skyjacking could be attempted.
Indirect approaches were also pursued, how-
ever. Air service boycotts of countries refusing
to extradite hijackers were proposed; coopera-
tion between the United States and Cuba was
encouraged ;25 and the need for an interna-
tional treaty was stressed. In March, 1969, the
International Federation of Air Line Pilots
Associations (IFALPA) threatened a pilots'
strike unless governments took action to extra-
dite or prosecute skyjackers. In September,
2 N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1968, at 33, col. 1. This
legislation was not enacted, presumably because
the threat to passengers and stewardesses would
not have been affected.
25 As a result, on February 15, 1973, the United
States and Cuba signed a treaty providing for
punishment or extradition of hijackers. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
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1969, the United States and other nations fin-
ally ratified the 1963 Tokyo Convention and
sought to update extradition treaties. All of
these actions were based on the assumption
that successful prosecution of skyjackers would
deter future attempts.
Nevertheless, the movement toward a pre-
ventionf model had begun. In February, 1969, at
the peak of the skyjacking phenomenon, the
FAA authorized physical searches of passen-
gers to be conducted at the airlines' discretion.
Between October, 1969 and January, 1970, three
major airlines initiated use of a system devel-
oped by the FAA. This system utilized an elec-
trical Wveapon-detection device directed at
passengers who fit the "behavioral profile" of
past skyjackers. The initial flurry of optimism
which greeted this system faded in February,
1970, however, when an Eastern Air Line plane
was hijacked at Newark airport while the pro-
file/magnetometer system was in use. Subse-
quently, the FAA admitted that their profile/
magnetometer system was "primarily a deter-
rent." 
26
Another change in policy toward skyjackers
began in 1970. Previously, airlines had fully
cooperated with skyjackers, on the theory that
cooperation posed less of a threat to passengers
and crew than active opposition would. But, on
July 4, 1970, Trans World Airlines officials be-
came convinced that hijacker Arthur Barkley
was a suicidal and irrational saboteur, and or-
dered that the plane be refused permission to
take off after refueling. In an unclear sequence
of events, passengers spontaneously deplaned
through emergency exits, the FBI shot out the
plane's tires, and FBI agents rushed and cap-
tured Barkley.
The PFLP's ,Operation Abu Thalaat in Sep-
tember, 1970 escalated both national and inter-
national efforts to control skyjacking.
Although armed guards had quietly been em-
ployed on selected flights since 1962, a highly-
publicized force of permanent "Sky Marshalls"
was now created, and Congress was asked to
provide $28 million to fund the program. In-
ternationally, The Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
was held in December, 1970. Neglecting the
escape cases which comprised the majority of
26 AIR LINE PILOT, May, 1970, at 18.
skyjackings, The Hague Convention was almost
exclusively concerned -with the recent PFLP
terrorism. The convention mandated prosecu-
tion or extradition of all hijackers, even for
those fleeing political persecution.
In 1971, the use of weapons detectors ex-
panded and 75 per cent of the 1200-man Sky
Marshall force was shifted to ground duty.
Additional efforts were made to make a public
gesture of strict treatment of skyjackers. For
example, FAA Administrator Shaffer urged
courts to impose the death penalty on con-
victed skyjackers, and a twenty-four hour
worldwide pilot strike was held to protest the
lack of international cooperation. Then, in July,
1972, the FAA instructed airlines to modify
their operating manuals to require airport offi-
cials and airline crews to disarm or overpower
hijackers whenever possible.
Nevertheless, by 1972, the primary emphasis
was shifting to prevention. In January, 1972
the FAA ordered tighter screening of passen-
gers and baggage. On July 7, 1972 the FAA
issued an emergency order requiring security
checks of all passengers on shuttle-type flights.
In August, 1972, the FAA mandated the refusal
of boarding to passengers who fit the behav-
ioral profile, unless physically or electronically
searched.
Prevention measures were fully implemented
in 1973. By January 5, 1973, airports were re-
quired to electronically screen all passengers
and to inspect all carry-on items. By February
5 (later extended to February 16 by court
order), local law enforcement officers were re-
quired to be stationed at all passenger check
points during boarding periods. As will be dis-
cussed below, these measures virtually elimi-
nated subsequent skyjackings in the United
States.
CONTROL EFFoRTs: SUMMARY
Skyjacking crime control methods in the
United States have passed through four succes-
sive but overlapping stages, with the later and
more expensive steps being taken only after
the demonstrated failure of earlier ones.
The first control efforts were pleas for inter-
national cooperation, the establishment of new
laws and cries for severe punishment of hi-
jackers. These activities began in 1961 with
[Vol. 66
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the first American hijackings, and although
they have continued to the present, they com-
prised the only actions taken through 1968.
Examples of this response include international
conventions (Tokyo, 1963; The Hague, 1970;
Montreal, 1971) and the real and threatened
pilot strikes. The manifest purpose of these ac-
tions was to increase the severity and certainty
-that is, the deterrent effectiveness-of pun-
ishment for hijackers. On another level, how-
ever, they may be considered a form of
symbolic protest.
27
Skyjackings abated for a few years after
1961, but resurged in 1968. The second phase
of control efforts began in February, 1969 with
the establishment of the FAA Task Force on
Deterrence of Air Piracy. Consistent with the
American positivistic tradition, this group fo-
cused on the psychological characteristics of
skyjackers, and developed the "behavioral pro-
file" system of detection which was used until
1973. Although this was a more direct ap-
proach and incorporated some aspects of pre-
vention (control efforts were temporally prior
to the crime), the primary intention was de-
terrence.
The interception phase was also a deterrent
measure intended to enhance the certainty of
capturing and punishing skyjackers. It began
in late 1970 after the PFLP's Operation Abu
Thalaat. The futility of the Sky Marshall pro-
gram was soon recognized, 2  however, and a
major reduction in the number of flying agents
began in 1971.
After the demonstrated failure of preceding
efforts, the prevention stage began on January
5, 1973 with the mandated screening of all pas-
sengers and the searching of all carry-on bag-
gage.
QUESTIONS FOR A PREVENTION MODEL
As noted earlier, there are three major is-
sues which a model of crime control must
address: effectiveness, fiscal cost, and social
costs. These issues will be examined in relation
to the prevention model of skyjacking control.
2 7 See generally J. GusFriE., SYmBoLIC CRu-
SADE (1963).
28 Turi, supra note 14, at 134; N.Y. Times, Jan.
17, 1973, at 36, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1971, at
13, col. 1. But see Sundberg, supra note 14, at 124.
Effectiveness
For several reasons it is difficult to confi-
dently assert the effectiveness of skyjacking
control efforts. First, various control measures
have been applied in different manners. Mag-
netometers, for example, were initially tested
at only a few airports and their use gradually
increased throughout the system. Second, the
effect of control efforts is cumulative. Since
previous efforts were not abandoned as new
controls were applied, it is difficult to isolate
the effects of any particular measure. Finally,
the late 1960's were a time of great social un-
rest and rapidly changing social conditions.
These social conditions may possibly be re-
flected in the changing number, styles and mo-
tives of hijackings. With these reservations in
mind, we proceed to an interpretation of the
data.
Data from which the effectiveness of control
measures may be inferred are presented in
Tables 2 and 3. It should be noted that there are
several possible ways to measure "effectiveness"
from these data.
If the goal is deterrence, then the data
should reflect a decline in the total number of
skyjacking attempts following the introduction
of a deterrence program. Until 1973, the data
for the United States do not reveal such a
decline. Thus, if there was any deterrent effect
of control efforts before 1973, it was not of a
magnitude to be reflected by these data. Addi-
tionally, Table 1 indicates that the proportion
of worldwide skyjacking attempts occurring
in the United States remained relatively con-
stant from 1969 through 1972. This lends fur-
ther support to the interpretation of the data
as revealing no major deterrent effect of con-
trol programs before 1973.
If the goal is interception or suppression of
hijackings after they have begun, then the rele-
vant statistics are the changes in percentages of
unsuccessful attempts (in which the hijacker
fails to take control of the flight) and of incom-
plete attempts (in which the hijacker is caught
or killed during the hijacking). In Tables 2
and 3 the increase in the percentage of unsuc-
cessful attempts from 1968-1972 is negligible,
suggesting that the profile/magnetometer de-
tection system initiated in 1969 has not been




Successful, Unsuccessful, and Incomplete Skyjackings, United States and Worldwide, 1930-1974
United States Othera
Year
Sb Uc I d Total S U Total
% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
1930-1967 58 (7) 33 (4) 8 (1) 99 (12) 78 (52) 22 (15) 100 (67)
1968 82 (18) 14 (3) 5 (1) 101 (22) 85 (11) 15 (2) 100 (13)
1969 83 (33) 15 (6) 3 (1) 101 (40) 79 (37) 21 (10) 100 (47)
1970 67 (18) 15 (4) 19 (5) 101 (27) 66 (37) 34 (19) 100 (56)
1971 44 (12) 22 (6) 33 (9) 99 (27) 32 (10) 68 (21) 100 (31)
1972 32 (10) 23 (7) 45 (14) 100 (31) 42 (13) 58 (18) 100 (31)
1973 50 (1) 0 (0) 50 (1) 100 (2) 50 (10) 50 (10) 100 (20)
1974 43 (3) 29 (2) 29 (2) 101 (7) 26 (5) 74 (14) 100 (19)
Total 61 (102) 19 (32) 20 (34) 100 (168) 62 (175) 38 (109) 100 (284)
SOURCE: FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, "WORLDWIDE REPORTED
HIJACKING ATTEmTs-SuMARIZATION," (January 1, 1975).
NOTE: Totals which do not add to 100% are due to rounding error.
a Worldwide, excluding United States.
b Successful. Hijacker controls flight and reaches destination or objective.
Unsuccessful. Hijacker attempts to take control of flight but fails. Hijacking may be averted either in flight
or on the ground.
d Incomplete. Hijacker is apprehended or killed during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit."
0 For other countries, the "incomplete" category is combined with "unsuccessful," due to lack of adequate data.
TABLE 3
Successful, Unsuccessful, and Incomplete Skyjackings, United States Scheduled Air Carriers, 1930-1974
Successfula Unsuccessfulb Incomplete' Total
Year % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
1930-1967 44 (4) 44 (4) 11 (1) 99 (9)
1968 76 (13) 18 (3) 6 (1) 100 (17)
1969 83 (33) 15 (6) 3 (1) 101 (40)
1970 68 (17) 16 (4) 16 (4) 100 (25)
1971 44(11) 24(6) 32(8) 100 (25)
1972 30 (8) 19 (5) 52 (14) 101 (27)
1973 0(0) 0(0) 100 (1)d 100 (1)d
1974 0 (0) 67 (2) 33 (1) 100 (3)
Total 59 (86) 20 (30) 21 (31) 100 (147)
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, "HIJACKING ATTEMPTS
ON U.S. SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT," (January 24, 1975).
NOTE: Totals which do not add to 100% are due to rounding error.
Hijacker controls flight and reaches destination or objective.
b Hijacker attempts to take control of flight but fails. Hijacking may be averted either in flight or on the ground.
c Hijacker is apprehended or killed during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit."
d This incident occurred on January 2, a few days before the full prevention program went into effect.
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yearly increase in the percentage of incomplete
attempts from 1969 through 1973 indicates that
in many cases, hijackers can be subdued after
they have taken control of a flight. Examination
of individual incidents 20 reveals that this suc-
cess is not attributable to the Sky Marshall pro-
gram. Rather, the success of the program is due
to the airlines' opposition policy and to the in-
creased willingness of law enforcement agen-
cies to rush planes which have landed to refuel
or pick up a ransom.80
If the goal is prevention, however, the most
important statistic is the number of successful
hijackings. A completely successful prevention
program would be indicated by the elimination
of successful or incomplete hijackings, al-
though there would not necessarily be any ef-
fect on the number of unsuccessful attempts
(unless there was also a deterrent effect). The
data in Table 2 show a dramatic decline in the
number of hijacking attempts and successes in
1973 and 1974, suggesting that the prevention
measures begun in January, 1973 have been
successful. The effectiveness of the prevention
program is more clearly evident, however, in
Table 3, which excludes helicopters, charter
planes and private aircraft, which have gener-
ally not been subject to prevention or other hi-
jacking control measures. Since the prevention
program began, there have been only three at-
tempts to hijack scheduled American air
carriers, none of which have been successful.
Examination of these three incidents,3 1 how-
ever, reveals characteristics of those hijackings
which may not be preventable under the cur-
rent system. Of the two unsuccessful 1974 hi-
jackers, one utilized hostages to force his way
aboard an out-of-service aircraft, and the other
murdered a terminal policeman and the co-pilot
before killing himself. These events, and the
1973 Rome massacre by terrorist hijackers,
demonstrate that a prevention program may
not be effective against well-organized, politi-
29DOMEsTIC AND FOREIGN AIRCRAFT HIyAcK-
INGS, supra note 20.
30 This may also be a reflection of the increase
in the number of extortion hijackings, since it is
necessary to land and open the outer doors in
order to collect the ransom. Escape and terrorist
skyjackings usually do not necessitate these ac-
tions.
31 DoMEsTIc AND FOREIGN AIRCRAFT HIJACK-
INGS, supra note 20.
cally motivated terrorists or extremely desper-
ate individuals. Those willing to engage in suf-
ficient violence are still capable of hijacking an
aircraft. On the other hand, the one incomplete
hijacking of 1974 was effected by use of a
razor blade, a nail and an emergency axe,
suggesting that resourceful individuals may be
able to circumvent prevention measures with-
out excessive violence.32 However, as Arey
noted, most of the individuals attempting sky-
jackings were amateurs, who were neither very
resourceful nor very determined. Moreover,
there was little evidence of conspiratorial ac-
tivity, suggesting that most hyjackers could be
deterred.3 3 Consistent with Arey's analysis, the
dramatic decrease in the number of skyjacking
attempts from 1968-1972 to 1973-1974 attests to
the deterrent effectiveness of the prevention
program.
The effectiveness of a prevention strategy
may be called into question by two alterna-
tive explanations of the post-1972 decrease in
skyjackings. The first of these is to consider
skyjacking a crime "fashion" or "fad" which
has run its course.3 4 The imitative nature of
many skyjackings, especially in the cases of
flights to Cuba and the parachute-extortion
cases,3 5 lends some support to this hypothesis.
The fad hypothesis, however, does not ade-
quately account for the precipitousness of the
decline in American skyjackings after 1972.
Moreover, dismissing skyjacking as a passing
fashion, without identifying the conditions for
its rise and subsequent decline, is nomencla-
ture, not explanation.
The other possible explanation is that sky-
32 In describing the relationship between crimi-
nals and those interested in crime prevention,
Sutherland noted that there is a positive correlation
in the development of techniques of crime and of
crime prevention. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY,
CRIMINOLOGY 258 (8th ed. 1970).
33 Arey observed that the pre-1969 hijacking at-
tempts were usually not politically motivated and
that the actual hijackings were inadequately
planned and executed. The belief that the hijackers
themselves were generally incompetent led to the
hope that if hijackings were made increasingly dif-
ficult, this type of hijacker would be deterred.
AREY, supra note 16, at 235.
34 E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note 31,
at 260.
35 For a discussion of the role of the media in
disseminating novel crime techniques see Sagarin,
supra note 19, at 7.
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jacking is a symptom of social tensions, and
that its decline simply reflects a decrease in so-
cial unrest. Several aspects of the data in
Table 2 support this explanation. First, the
peak of the skyjacking phenomenon-1968 and
1969-coincided with the United States' deep-
est involvement in Vietnam and with the final
stages of the 1960's riots and demonstrations.
Second, the end of United States military in-
volvement in Vietnam coincided with the dra-
matic decrease in American skyjackings. Fi-
nally, the number of skyjacking attempts in
other parts of the world also declined after
1970, possibly suggesting a general decrease in
social tensions.
In several respects, however, the social ten-
sions hypothesis appears deficient. First, with
few exceptions,36 no link between skyjack-
ing and the Vietnam war is evident. Most
American skyjackers were not protesting the
war, evading the draft, or taking any sort of
war-related action. Thus, the simultaneity of
the conclusion of the United States' involve-
ment in Vietnam and the major decline in
skyjackings appears more coincidental than
causal. Second, the social tensions hypothesis
does not explain why the principal skyjacking
era coincides only with the end of the major
period of riots and demonstrations. Third, be-
cause "social unrest" is a difficult concept to
identify operationally, it is difficult to state
whether social tensions are in fact declining.
By some measures (e.g., riots, assassinations),
social tensions in the 1970's have lessened, but
by others (e.g., violent crime rates, changes in
heads of state, political kidnappings) they have
not.3 7 Finally, although both American and
worldwide skyjacking rates have declined since
1969 or 1970, an abrupt decline is noted only
for the United States. This coincides with the
imposition of the prevention program.
These three explanations (fad, social ten-
36 There have been only four Vietnam-related
hijackings: February 9, 1968; September 18, 1970;
June 11, 1971; and July 2, 1972. DOMESTIC AND
FOREIGN AIRcRAFT HIJACKINGS, supra note 20.
37 For statistics on the increasing crime rate for
violent crime see FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 59 (1973). For a discussion of the
number of political kidnappings in recent years see
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
93i CONG., 1sT SEss., REPORT ON PoLr.ICA KID-
NAPPINGS (Comm. Print 1973).
sions and prevention effectiveness) are not mu-
tually exclusive, and a theory of skyjacking
etiology would probably need to consider all
three. Our present concern, however, is
whether the apparent effectiveness of a preven-
tion model for skyjacking control can be ex-
plained away by larger social processes. In this
case, neither of the two alternative explana-
tions appears to adequately account for the
difference in American skyjacking rates for
1968-1972 and 1973-1974.
Fiscal Costs
When considering the fiscal costs of skyjack-
ing control programs, two comparisons are of
interest. The first is a comparison of the cost
of a control program with the costs of skyjack-
ing itself. The second is a comparison of alter-
native control programs.
Due to the absence of systematic data on the
costs of skyjacking, the author has been un-
able to make the first kind of comparison.38
Nevertheless, based on data which are available,
some general observations may be noted. First,
different forms of hijackings result in varied
costs. Escape flights to Cuba, which comprise
the great majority of hijackings in the United
States, are relatively inexpensive. Extortions
have been less frequent but more expensive,
since the average ransom paid has been over
$400,000. Even so, almost all extorted funds
have been recovered, and the net loss to the
airlines has not been crippling.3 9 Most expen-
sive, but least frequent, have been the terrorist
bombings which have destroyed at least three
American jetliners.
A second observation is that while most hi-
jackings have been relatively inexpensive in
financial terms, the airlines are vulnerable to
severe financial losses through extortion or
terrorism unless preventive measures are
taken. Finally, it may be impossible to deter-
38 Part of this problem is due to the fact that
the Federal Aviation Administration, the Air
Transport Association and the International Civil
Aviation Organization have not maintained statis-
tics on this particular point.
39 Except for the $200,000 extorted by Cooper
and the $2 million extorted by three hijackers in
November, 1972 which is currently in the posses-
sion of the Cuban government, all extorted funds
have been recovered. Hijacking/Extortion At-
tempts, supra note 20.
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mine whether the airline industry's constant
emphasis on skyjacking control has been based
primarily on concern for public safety or on
self-interest. Public statements have regularly
emphasized the former but in this instance both
interests are served by a prevention policy.
The second fiscal comparison which is avail-
able is a comparison of the costs of alternative
control programs. The first phase of control ef-
forts (legislation, public statements and inter-
national conventions) was virtually cost-free,
but had no detectable effect on the number of
skyjackings. Since the costs were split between
the federal government and the individual air-
lines, the cost of the profile/magnetometer sys-
tem is difficult to estimate. In addition, these
costs varied with the extent to which the sys-
tem was employed. It has been estimated, how-
ever, that a version of this system designed for
full coverage of United States' airports might
be more expensive than the current prevention
program. 40  In contrast, cost information is
available for both the Sky Marshall program
and the passenger screening (prevention) pro-
gram. The prevention program cost an esti-
mated $120 to $150 million in 1973, as com-
pared to the estimated annual cost of $28 to $30
million for the Sky Marshall program. The
greater expense of the prevention system may
be placed in perspective by the realization that
it is deferred by a 59-cent surcharge on each
flight coupon.4 '
Social Costs
The third issue which a crime control model
must address is whether the advantages out-
weigh the social costs. For the prevention
model of skyjacking control, three types of so-
cial cost are considered below.
4 0 AVIATION WEEK, June 11, 1973, at 31.
4 1 The Air Transport Association estimated that
the prevention program would cost the airlines
$150 million per year. U.S. NEws & W. REP., Jan.
15, 1973, at 17. N. K. Edwards, Chief of In-Flight
Security for the Federal Aviation Administration,
estimated that the airlines would receive $114 mil-
lion from the 59-cent surcharge on each ticket to
pay for their security activities under the prevention
program, and added that the federal government
has spent $6.4 million on magnetometers. During
fiscal years 1972 and 1973, the federal government
spent $30 million and $28 million, principally to
support the Sky Marshall program. Letter from
N. K. Edwards to author, November 9, 1973.
The most obvious form of social cost in-
curred under the prevention model is the in-
convenience and indignity of being
electronically screened and having one's bag-
gage physically searched. Although most pas-
sengers have accepted the necessity for the
searches, a number of regular business travel-
ers have complained about delays resulting
from the screening process. However, when
the FAA announced in June, 1973 that it was
considering returning to a modification of the
"behavioral profile" system, public opinion was
overwhelmingly in favor of the prevention sys-
tem. This forced the FAA to announce that it
was not planning to relax security after all.
42
Another social cost issue is the questioned
legality of airport searches under the fourth
amendment. Although the use of "official" fed-
eral antihijacking systems has been approved
in dicta,43 the indiscriminate searches con-
ducted under the current prevention system
may face constitutional challenge, since they
are conducted with neither warrant nor prob-
able cause. They cannot accurately be described
as consent searches, since one's right to travel
is impinged if consent is not granted. Also,
they may not be considered investigative stops,
since there are typically no "specific and arti-
culable facts which . . . reasonably warrant
that intrusion." 44 A more appropriate legal ra-
tionale for these searches may be that of intru-
sions sui generis, for which the reasonableness
of the search is tested by "balancing the need
to search against the intrusion which the
search entails." 45
Whatever legal rationale is used to justify
these searches, the fact remains that most re-
sultant arrests are for possession of narcotics
-AVIATION WEEK, June 11, 1973 at 31; AvIA-
TION WEEK, May 7, 1973, at 26; N.Y. Times,
August 11, 1973, at 50, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 5,
1973, at 1, col. 7.
43United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
44 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).
45 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967). For a discussion of the constitu-
tionality of airport searches see Kraus, Searching
for Hijackers: Constitutionality, Costs and Alter-
natives, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 383 (1973); Wright,
Hijacking Risks and Airport Frisks: Reconciling
Airline Security with the Fourth Amendment, 9
CRim. L. BuLL. 491 (1973) ; Note, Airport Security
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 CoLum.
L. REv. 1039 (1971).
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or other nonviolent offenses, rather than for
possession of weapons. To protect against the
overzealous law enforcement which this in-
vites, Wright has suggested two safeguards:
the right to terminate the search at any time
by declining to board the aircraft, and the ex-
clusion of any evidence found which does not
relate to air piracy, sabotage or other crimes
of violence. Although it is questionable at this
point whether these guarantees will be adopted
in future court decisions, it is clear that appro-
priate legal safeguards are at least possible
within the prevention model of skyjacking
control.46
The final social cost issue is crime displace-
ment. Several studies have suggested that
crime control efforts may have more effect on
the form or location of crime than on its ac-
tual incidence. 47 It must then be determined
whether this has occurred under the prevention
model of skyjacking control, and if so, whether
the modifications are worse than the original
evil.
Because the incidence of skyjacking is lower
than for other forms of violent crime, it is im-
possible to determine whether the prevention
program simply channeled potential hijackers
into other forms of deviance. However, psy-
chological studies of hijackers have indicated
that, except for the terrorist activities, the
skyjackings are typically poorly planned, half-
heartedly executed and frequently motivated
on rather short notice either by media cover-
age of previous events or by the apparent sim-
plicity of the offense.48 It appears unlikely that
hijackers who are thwarted by a prevention
program would be driven into other forms of
crime.
The form of skyjacking, however, does ap-
pear to have been affected by the prevention
program. The recent hijackings of helicopters
and small chartered aircraft4s are obvious ex-
46Wright, supra note 45, at 513; cf. Kraus,
supra note 45.
47 E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESsEY, supra note 32,
at 260; J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 187 (1967). Black,
Forms and Reforms of Whoredom: Notes on the
Sociology of Prostitution and Moral Enterprise
(Working Paper No. 15, Center for Research on
Social Organization, Department of Sociology,
University of Michigan, March, 1966).
48 J. AREY, supra note 16, at 235.
amples.&49 More serious, however, is the in-
creased violence associated with skyjacking at-
tempts during the prevention phase of control
efforts. In October, 1972, four hijackers avoided
the electronic screening measures in effect by
shooting their way aboard the aircraft, killing a
gate agent and wounding a ground crewman. 50
If security measures had been less restrictive,
the hijacking might have been a routine diver-
sion to Cuba, with no loss of life. In another at-
tempted hijacking, Samuel Byck in February,
1974 killed an airport policeman and the co-
pilot before taking his own life. Finally, the
terrorist skyjacking in Rome in December,
1973 resulted in the deaths of at least thirty
people. It should be noted, however, that exces-
sive violence was apparently an intentional
aspect of both the Rome massacre and the




The history of skyjacking control efforts in
the United States demonstrates a progression
from a deterrence model to a prevention model
of crime control. The prevention model was
adopted only after the demonstrated inability
of deterrent measures to control skyjacking.
The fiscal cost of the prevention program is
four to five times the cost of previous control
efforts, but this cost has not drawn strenuous
opposition. There are also social costs associ-
ated with the prevention model, including in-
convenience, indiscriminate searches of ques-
tionable legality and possible displacement of
crime. Of these, the most serious issue is the
unresolved legal status of the searches.
Since skyjacking is one of the few crimes
for which a prevention model has been
adopted, consideration of its relevant charac-
teristics should be instructive for determination
of other offenses which may be more appropri-
ately controlled through prevention of the of-
fense rather than through deterrence or
rehabilitation of the offender.
49DOsMESTIC AND FoREIGN AIRCRAFT HIJACK-
INGS, supra note 20. The numbers of these incidents
may be obtained by subtracting the N's in Table 3
from the corresponding N's in Table 2.
50 N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
53 U.S. NEws & W. REP., Mar. 4, 1974, at 21;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
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The first characteristic is the high demand
for effective control of the offense. Because
skyjacking is a crime which poses great threat
to both life and property, it was actively op-
posed by an influential traveling public, a
major industry and a large government bu-
reaucracy. A second characteristic is that the
large financial cost of the prevention program
was able to be passed on to the affected public
without imposing financial hardship on any in-
dividual or group of individuals. Third, the so-
cial costs associated with the prevention pro-
gram have not proven excessive, although
there is possibility for abuse of the search
process by overzealous enforcement agents. Fi-
nally, skyjacking is an offense which can only
occur within a limited environment. This envi-
ronment (airports and aircraft) is one which
was already closely managed in many respects,
and which was amenable to physical and tech-
nological control over potential offenders.
The application of a prevention model in the
form of environmental control cannot be con-
sidered a panacea to the problems of crime.
Nevertheless, under conditions such as those
described here, prevention strategies may be a
viable approach to the control of some forms
of crime. Demonstration projects and addi-
tional research should further specify those
crimes and conditions for which a prevention
model may be appropriate.
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